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Introduction 
Business owners seeking to start or expand a small 
business have limited options for financing. They can 
go to a bank for a loan, but they may have trouble 
qualifying for the loan due to the age of the business, 
absence of collateral, lack of equity in the business, 
thin margins, or other factors. While online business 
lenders may offer faster response times and lower 
underwriting hurdles, they often do so in exchange 
for exorbitant rates and reduced ability to customize 
their financing or add broader value to the business 
beyond the money. Business owners could try going 
to venture capitalists for equity, but venture capital-
ists and angel investors will demand some control 
over the company and need an exit strategy, generally 
requiring that the company be sold. The company 
might also not have a fast enough growth curve to 
interest a venture capitalist. Raising money through 
a crowdfunding platform, such as Kickstarter, is 
another option. But until recently, crowdfunding has 
been limited to raising donations, not investments, 
through such strategies.
These options can be good for some business own-
ers, depending on their business goals. But for many 
business owners, especially those who need growth 
capital but might like to maintain control and owner-
ship of their businesses for the long-term, other forms 
of financing are needed. 
In this perspectives brief, we look at two nonprofit 
“alternative business financiers” who have been broad-
ening the financing options available for community-
based businesses:
• Vested for Growth, a product of the New 
Hampshire Community Loan Fund, provides  
businesses with a range of 
debt/equity hybrid financ-
ing deal structures involving 
any combination of debt, 
royalty payments that share 
a percentage of sales revenue for a period of time or 
up to a pre-determined amount, and/or warrants to 
purchase stock in the company. Vested for Growth 
shapes its capital to businesses’ needs, pricing its 
investments in ways that balance risk and reward.  
• The Local Enterprise Assistance Fund (LEAF) in 
Boston, Massachusetts, com-
bines its debt financing with 
Direct Public Offerings (DPOs) 
of subordinate debt raised 
directly by companies from 
local supporters.
These options can help businesses grow while 
maintaining their current ownership structure and 
connections to the community. 
Early results from both initiatives suggest that both 
the borrowing businesses and community lenders can 
succeed with these financing strategies: businesses are 
getting flexible financing while maintaining control 
of the company, and community lenders are earning 
returns that help to sustain their operations.
Vested for Growth
The Colors of Money: How Vested for Growth 
Helped One New Hampshire Business Grow
In 2009, even as the nation was in the grips of the 
Great Recession, Bob Goldstein and Stephen Singlar 
were ready to grow their company, Single Digits. The 
firm, which provides high-speed internet software 
and services to clients like hotels, hospitals, office 
buildings, and schools, had been successful since 
its founding in 2003. But the CEO, Bob Goldstein, 
recalled that in 2009, their “growth was being ham-
pered from lack of access to the right kind of capital.” 
Single Digits had been dependent on bank financ-
ing, but banks would only offer a loan to the busi-
ness based on the personal credit of the two owners. 
Moreover, Goldstein noted that they “didn’t have the 
explosive growth that venture capital firms look for.” 
What Single Digits did have was “a sustainable growth 
model that just needed fuel.”
Goldstein and Singlar had an idea to acquire a 
local competitor to grow their business, but they 
needed $2 million for the deal. “We had dozens of 
meetings with banks, angel investors, and venture 
capital firms,” said Goldstein. “We started to get some 
interest from venture guys, but the valuations felt 
predatory and would have left us without control.”
Then Goldstein met with John Hamilton of Vested 
for Growth. Vested for Growth put together a financ-
ing proposal for Single Digits, but more importantly 
at the time, “John helped us more clearly understand 
the kind of financing we needed,” Goldstein remem-
bers. “He articulated the roles of banks, mezzanine 
debt, royalty finance, venture capital, private equity—
he helped me find ‘the right color of money.’” Single 
Digits ended up finding a community bank willing 
to provide $1 million of senior debt if the company 
could raise $1 million of subordinate debt, which it 
was able to do by borrowing from family and friends.
Two years later, Single Digits saw another growth 
opportunity to expand its services to shopping malls. 
This time, Goldstein and Singlar knew where to go. 
“We went right to Vested for Growth.” 
Vested for Growth partnered with Seed Venture 
Financing, another fund from Massachusetts, to 
provide another $1.2 million of subordinate debt. The 
five-year, subordinated note carried an interest rate of 
12 percent, and a warrant enabling Vested for Growth 
to purchase stock representing 0.63 percent of the 
company at any point over the following ten years, at 
a price of $0.01 per share. The note provided flexibil-
ity on the timing of repayment to Vested for Growth 
if debt service coverage were to fall below the senior 
lender’s required ratio of 1.20. Goldstein said that the 
financing “helped us maintain a 25 to 30 percent per 
year growth rate without having to do a ‘Shark Tank’ 
type of deal where we’d be giving up a majority inter-
est in the business.” 
With Vested for Growth’s financing in hand, Single 
Digits went on to grow revenues from $9 million in 
2011 to $12 million in 2012. At that point, Goldstein 
and Singlar were ready for the big time—they success-
fully raised $10 million from Tudor Growth Equity. 
The firm continued to pay Vested for Growth on 
term, and since 2011 has added 111 jobs to its payroll. 
In the first quarter of 2017, Tudor Growth Equity 
exited and was replaced with funding from Bregal 
Sagemount, a private equity firm.
Goldstein highlighted the role of Vested for 
Growth: “There was a space in time, between per-
sonally guaranteed bank debt and Tudor Growth 
Equity, where we needed the funding from Vested for 
Growth. I didn’t realize it at the time, but when we 
started building our business I didn’t truly understand 
all the different flavors of debt and equity. Vested for 
Growth helped me to understand all those pieces.”
Development of the Vested for Growth Concept
Vested for Growth’s mission is to “widen the economic 
winners’ circle” by helping businesses grow while 
employing and investing in the futures of all employ-
ees, including those on the front line. 
John Hamilton, Managing Director of Vested for 
Growth, said his team came up with the idea of expand-
ing the financing options for New Hampshire busi-
nesses by talking to bankers and businesses. Mainstream 
bankers told him that there were times when they 
would be working with a business that they liked, but 
couldn’t invest in it due to regulations or bank poli-
cies. Hamilton also saw a pattern in the post-recession 
landscape. “There were good banks making loans, and 
equity investors, but not much in between,” he said. 
“What was needed was risk tolerant capital—there were 
good growth plans getting shelved because the business 
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owner would get turned down by a bank and say, ‘I 
don’t want equity where I have to give up control or 
ownership.’ And so they shelved their growth plans. We 
wanted to give businesses a second option of living out 
their growth plan by having capital that would fill that 
gap—capital that could be risk tolerant without asking 
businesses to give up control or ownership.”
By providing flexible financing to these businesses, 
Vested for Growth helps to retain and create better jobs 
for all employees, including those without four-year 
college degrees. 
The team set about building a business model that 
differentiates Vested for Growth from other financiers 
in the following ways:
• Having private capital through the New Hampshire 
Community Loan Fund gives Vested for Growth the 
flexibility to shape its financing to businesses’ needs 
by offering a range of options that fill the gap between 
pure debt and pure equity products. This includes 
royalty financing and debt with stock warrants, 
which allow owners to retain control of the company. 
Having a customizable range of financial products 
means that Vested for Growth allows CEOs to make 
the best choice for their companies, as opposed to 
having to fit into one type of deal structure. 
• Recognizing that businesses that invest in their front-
line employees, especially in a tight labor market, 
outperform their peers. A good way to create better-
quality jobs is to help businesses that hire lower-
income people discover profitable ways to improve 
their recruitment, retention and workplace cultures. 
Vested for Growth encourages companies to engage 
their employees so that the workers understand how 
their job is connected to the business’s bottom line 
and how their ideas can add value to the customer. 
A variety of progressive management methods can 
achieve this outcome, but each must be appropriate 
to the business’s size, stage, and industry sector, as 
well as the company’s leadership style. It may include 
profit sharing, “open book management,” financial-
literacy training, or cross-training to support skill-
based pay. Hamilton said that “the powerful part 
is that this is a ‘win/win’ strategy that leads to the 
growth of the business, because it helps create a more-
engaged and-committed employee who, in turn, is 
able to develop more loyal customers.” 
• Combining financing with a variety of customized 
business-education options, including the forma-
tion of advisory boards, participation in CEO 
peer groups, and connections to expert business 
coaches to support the company’s success.  
• Focusing on companies with $1 million to $30 
million in revenue and deals of $1 million or less. 
Vested for Growth believes that this market is 
underserved by institutional investors. While it 
is traditionally territory for angel investors, these 
investors are largely focused on early-stage or start-
up companies and often limit themselves to the 
high-tech field and companies that are considered 
hyper-growth. 
• Focusing on earning steady returns from companies 
with solid growth plans—as opposed to “chasing 
gazelles,” as Hamilton describes the venture capi-
tal strategy of buying companies with explosive 
growth—then selling them to new owners. Based 
on its financial modeling, Vested for Growth set a 
goal of least four deals a year with an average size of 
$200,000 and an average return of 15 percent, which 
allows it to cover its expenses on a self-sufficient 
basis (without dependence on grants). This pricing 
is relatively inexpensive compared to pure equity. 
Since both royalties and interest are tax-deductible 
expenses, after-tax financing expenses to businesses 
would be in the range of 12 to 14 percent.
How It Works
The kind of financing Hamilton envisioned exists on 
Wall Street. It is called mezzanine financing. Hamilton 
said that the problem in mezzanine funding is that it 
is “easy to get in big bites of $300 million dollars, but 
not if you want $300,000.” Vested for Growth set about 
finding a way to “bring mezzanine financing from Wall 
Street to Main Street.” 
The way in which Vested for Growth accomplished 
this goal was to develop a suite of financing tools that 
blend debt and equity characteristics:
• Debt with royalty financing involves a company 
providing debt payments plus a percentage of its 
gross sales as a way of repaying an investment. For 
example, Vested for Growth helped entrepreneur 
Stephane Anglade purchase and grow Comstock 
Industries, a precision machine shop in Meredith, 
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Pure Royalty is another approach that includes no 
debt or fixed monthly payment. All the return comes 
as a percentage of revenue paid monthly until the 
aggregate of all payments equals the multiplier (such 
as 1.5 to 3 times the original investment). This is par-
ticularly useful in mergers and acquisitions in which 
there is some short-term uncertainty. This “shock 
absorber” allows a business to pay in accordance to 
how well it is performing. This also helps when the 
company is so optimistic about its future growth of 
sales that it wants to cap the overall return.
These innovative offerings accompany more  
traditional business loans and investments that the New 
Hampshire Community Loan Fund makes, including 
subordinate and senior debt, and pure equity investments. 
Vested for Growth works with business owners to 
determine the best way to structure the financing to 
meet their goals while providing a return that matches 
the level of risk in the investment. 
For example, one client, Rustic Crust, anticipated 
fast growth in sales and profits through natural foods 
retailers for its ready-made pizza crusts, pizza sauces, 
and flatbreads. Rather than share royalties or stock 
warrants with Vested for Growth, Rustic Crust pre-
ferred to structure a debt offering with a higher inter-
est rate reflecting the risk-adjusted return that Vested 
for Growth needed to make the deal work. Overall, 
Hamilton said, Vested for Growth’s goal is to “provide  
a suite of financing tools so that a company can create 
its own future based on its own agenda,” rather than 
having to bend to the interests of outside investors.
New Hampshire, when its founder decided to sell. 
Vested for Growth provided an unsecured investment 
of $400,000. The investment carried an interest rate 
of 8 percent. On top of that interest rate, Comstock 
Industries also agreed to pay a royalty of 0.25 percent 
of the monthly gross sales of the company, until its 
aggregate royalty payments to Vested for Growth 
totaled $150,000 or until 5 years after the loan closed, 
whichever came sooner.   
To promote its mission, Vested for Growth also 
provides a “good driver” discount, whereby a por-
tion of the royalty payment is rebated if the company 
achieves a different stretch goal every year related to 
employee engagement. Under this program, Anglade 
and Vested for Growth worked together to iden-
tify a goal of increasing participation in Comstock 
Industry’s 401(k) plan from 20 percent to 50 percent. 
By achieving the goal, Comstock received a refund of 
25 percent of the royalty payments it was making to 
Vested for Growth. Anglade said that they got “a good 
recruiting tool from having the best 401(k) plan out 
there.” Anglade also appreciated that under Vested for 
Growth’s financing structure, there is no prepayment 
penalty on the loan.
• Debt with equity warrants involves a company 
providing stock options as a way of sharing upside 
with an investor, who will also charge some interest 
rate to provide a floor for their return. Vested for 
Growth’s investment in Single Digits is an example 
of such a deal.  
• Debt plus royalty and warrant financing contain 
elements of both of the options above. An example 
is a $500,000 subordinated debt investment Vested 
for Growth provided to VXI, a headset manufac-
turer in Rollinsford, New Hampshire, in 2009. The 
investment carried a fixed interest rate for five years, 
a royalty payment of 0.25 percent of monthly gross 
sales, and stock warrants for a small percent of the 
company. Tom Manero, former CFO of VXI, said, 
“We would not have been able to raise this financ-
ing from a bank—our senior lender had already 
extended as much as they could do within their nor-
mal parameters. We talked to other alternative lend-
ers and mezzanine providers—but they could not be 
flexible or creative with their financing. Vested for 
Growth had more patient capital, was easier to work 
with, and more flexible.” VXI paid off the loan in 
2012, and was sold to a competitor in October 2016.  
FIGURE 1. VXI EMPLOYEES AT WORK
Photo courtesy of NH Community Loan Fund
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Vested for Growth’s offerings are varied and flex-
ible. As such, Vested for Growth works with business 
owners at the outset of any project to explore all the 
financing options and structure the best deal. “As hap-
pened at first in the case of Single Digits, sometimes 
that may even mean a financing structure that doesn’t 
involve Vested for Growth,” notes Hamilton, “but we 
are still happy to help.” 
Additional business education may include refer-
rals to a network of specialized consultants, help 
in building advisory boards, connections to peer 
groups of other business leaders in similar industries, 
growth plan analysis to refinance, and risk evalua-
tions. Stephane Anglade of Comstock Industries said 
that the biggest advantage of working with Vested for 
Growth “was not the financing, it was the other ways 
that Vested for Growth helped me—connecting me to 
people in the community, inviting me to join a peer 
group of business owners, and helping me qualita-
tively improve the 401(k) plan.”
Hamilton emphasizes that “a good investor doesn’t 
just provide capital—they work to make that company 
much more successful. That’s why our investment is 
[often] structured as a percentage instead of interest—
so we are truly in this together.” 
Business owners agree that Vested for Growth has 
been truly on their side. Tom Manero, former VXI CFO, 
said that “Vested for Growth had a very different focus 
from other lenders—they were much more focused on 
the long-term viability of the company and how they 
could support it. The number one thing for Vested for 
Growth was, ‘Is the company doing well and taking care 
of its employees?’ They wanted to get paid back, and the 
best way to accomplish that was to help businesses grow 
their companies by growing their people.”
In the event of a default, Hamilton said that they 
“seek to first understand what caused the default and 
then to find a way to help the business to address the 
systemic issue so that it gets resolved and the right les-
sons are learned. This sometimes involves our enlisting 
value added business consultants or advisors to sup-
port the analysis and process. Doing this also helps 
alleviate senior lender concerns and they tend to be 
more patient as a result. Patience and flexibility is often 
key, and as long as the company is being diligent and 
focused, we find that to be useful.”
Results to Date
Since 2009, Vested for Growth has provided $5.67 
million to twelve companies, impacting 842 jobs and 
helping to create 338 new jobs. This statistic does not 
include traditional debt or equity investments in busi-
nesses by Vested for Growth’s parent corporation, the 
New Hampshire Community Loan Fund, which has 
provided businesses with an additional $12 million in 
the past three years through its Business Builder lend-
ing program. Overall, Vested for Growth has earned a 
14.2 percent internal rate of return on its investments 
to date net of losses (before operating expenses and 
cost of funds). 
Clearly, Vested for Growth is not the least costly 
funding source—bank debt is the best option for 
that—but business owners report that they received 
good value for their financing. Tom Manero of VXI 
said that “Vested for Growth was instrumental in 
helping the company to grow.” Stephane Anglade of 
Comstock Industries noted that the process of negoti-
ating the investment was more difficult and costly for 
him and his primary lender than expected, particu-
larly around the risk mitigation of Vested for Growth’s 
unsecured investment, but that Vested for Growth is 
“a very viable financing option, all of that said—in 
hindsight it was a good deal and the rate was fair.”
As can be seen from the case studies, not all of 
the companies financed by Vested for Growth have 
stayed under local ownership. “We realize that com-
panies can be sold and we don’t prohibit that option 
when we invest,” Hamilton said. “We do take steps 
to maximize the retention of good jobs. First, we do 
not use traditional equity in order to avoid adding 
any incentive or need for the company to sell. One 
of the best ways to keep the business rooted is to 
have the team operate at peak efficiency, outper-
forming their industry peers. This is where we focus 
our efforts after closing to reduce the likelihood 
that a new buyer would risk uprooting the team 
and undermine smooth operations. We also antici-
pate the possibility of a sale and advocate putting 
some structured incentive in place so that front-line 
employees share in the ‘upside.’ We do this through a 
variety of means, including severance/stock pack-
ages, etc. Given the tight labor market, we have 
found that it is easier to negotiate this into deals 
because it helps with retention.”
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Based on his experience financing Single Digits, 
Bob Goldstein recommends reaching out to a group 
like Vested for Growth. “If you have a solid business 
that is growing, it is always worth your time to have a 
conversation with a group like Vested for Growth—
they will sit down with you for an hour or two and help 
you understand what financing structures are in the 
market where you fit. They’ll be honest with you—you 
never know with banks and venture capital whether 
they have your interests in mind or only their own.”
Direct Public Offerings
Direct Public Offerings: The Story of Wellspring 
Cooperative Corporation and the Wellspring 
Harvest Greenhouse
Wellspring Cooperative Corporation helps to incubate 
and grow worker-owned businesses in Springfield, 
Massachusetts, in partnership with large local employ-
ers, such as the University of Massachusetts, local 
public school systems, and Bay State Health, a regional 
hospital. Wellspring works with these “anchor institu-
tions” to develop local, worker-owned businesses that 
meet their purchasing needs.
One such opportunity that Wellspring identified 
was an interest from the anchor institutions in pur-
chasing local food. After reviewing several options for 
local food businesses, Wellspring identified the oppor-
tunity to develop a greenhouse that could grow fresh 
greens and herbs year-round. Wellspring developed a 
business plan for “Wellspring Harvest,” working with 
a local hydroponic grower who helped with technical 
details and meeting with the anchor institutions and a 
local supermarket chain, Big Y, to determine the right 
mix of crops to grow. Fred Rose, co-director of the 
Wellspring Cooperative Corporation, recalls that one 
of the hardest parts of starting the business was “find-
ing two acres of undeveloped, non-polluted, affordable 
land in Springfield—but we did it,” ultimately signing 
a purchase and sale agreement for a site owned by the 
Springfield Redevelopment Authority (SRA).
There was just one hitch. Wellspring needed to raise 
$900,000 to close on the land and build the greenhouse. 
The clock was ticking on this financing as well, since 
the SRA was only willing to tie up the land for a limited 
amount of time and required that Wellspring Harvest 
put down a $5,000 non-refundable deposit per month 
to keep the purchase option alive. Rose reached out to 
LEAF, a nonprofit loan fund based in Boston whose mis-
sion is to “provide financing and development assistance 
to cooperatives and social purpose ventures that create 
and save jobs for low-income people.” 
Gerardo Espinoza, the Executive Director of LEAF, 
was excited about the project. “There were a number of 
attractive elements,” he related, “it was a worker coop-
erative, the location was in Springfield in a low-income 
area, and the group had a social justice philosophy. Also, 
this was more than just one play—Wellspring is looking 
to develop many more worker co-ops in Springfield.” 
LEAF helped Wellspring to refine the business plan and 
delve into the numbers. Rose said that “LEAF really 
helped us think through the equity requirements and to 
connect to other lenders, understanding what we needed 
to raise.” LEAF and Coastal Enterprises Inc., another 
alternative financier, were willing to provide $500,000 of 
senior debt to finance the project, but only if Wellspring 
could raise $400,000 in subordinate financing still to 
raise for the project to go forward.
Wellspring had also worked in the past with a local 
investment advisor, Robert Zevin, who specializes in 
working with wealthy clients interested in “impact 
investing,” double-bottom-line deals where investors 
could receive a financial return while helping to gener-
ate a positive social impact for their community. Zevin 
believed that some of his clients might be interested 
in purchasing shares of preferred equity in the green-
house business. However, as Wellspring and Zevin 
worked together to further assess interest from these 
prospective investors, Rose realized that they “would 
not raise enough equity to satisfy lenders.”
FIGURE 2. LEAF-WELLSPRING COLLABORATION
Photo courtesy of the Local Enterprise Assistance Fund
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Espinoza had an idea for Wellspring. LEAF had pro-
vided loans to several other businesses in Massachusetts 
that had raised subordinate financing through a DPO. 
With a DPO, a company offers an investment directly to 
the public, instead of through a Wall Street intermediary. 
“We came in kicking and screaming, because this was 
new territory for us,” said Rose. “The DPOs we knew of, 
like Artisan Beverage—they had an existing base of cus-
tomers who already liked their product, from whom they 
could raise the funds. We didn’t know how well it would 
go.” On the other hand, according to Rose, “it seemed like 
the only alternative.” Wellspring didn’t have relationships 
with angel investors or venture capitalists, but more to 
the point, it could neither pay these investors the returns 
they would have demanded, nor could it offer them 
decision-making power in what was to be a worker-run 
cooperative. “All of our lenders and investors are mission 
driven,” said Rose. “We didn’t know of other conventional 
lenders or investors who would do this deal.”
Wellspring worked with LEAF, DPO consultant 
Jenny Kassan, and Robert Zevin to devise and execute 
a capitalization plan for the needed subordinated 
financing. The idea was to raise two tiers of funds: 
$150,000 in preferred equity and $250,000 from a DPO 
of subordinated debt.
• The preferred equity would be raised from socially 
responsible investors—generally high-net-worth 
individuals working with investment advisors and 
wealth management firms. In general, the term 
“preferred equity” refers to an equity instrument 
that may take on some characteristics of debt. In 
this case, the preferred equity carried a fixed return 
for investors of 3 percent. For the first five years of 
the cooperative, the return would accrue to inves-
tors but not be paid out in cash. Starting in year 
five, Wellspring would pay back the investors out 
of its earnings—over time, replacing the preferred 
equity with worker-owned cooperative stock shares. 
During this five-year redemption period, the inves-
tors would receive a higher yield, of 6 percent, 
on their outstanding capital—thus providing the 
investors with a total internal rate of return over 
a ten-year period of about 4 percent. Beyond this 
return, preferred equity shareholders would receive 
a dividend if the co-op made income in excess of 
$50,000 a year. The amount of the dividend would 
be one-third of the excess income over $50,000, 
distributed equally among all preferred shares. 
• The most junior financing in the deal structure 
would be a DPO of subordinated debt, marketed 
to small, retail investors as well as high-net-worth 
investors. The DPO investment would pay inves-
tors a return of 3 percent over a term of five years. 
However, investors would be required to write 
Wellspring to request to take out their money, 
otherwise the investment would roll over and 
remain in the company. Also, interest payments for 
the first two years of the loan would be deferred 
and paid to investors upon redemption of the 
note. The minimum investment was $5,000 for 
qualified investors and $1,000 for any investor. 
According to Amine Benali, Director of Strategy 
and Development at LEAF, the low return was 
“designed to target people or investors who wanted 
to express views toward the mission of the green-
house, secondary to financial return.”
A DPO is a type of financial security, and as such is 
subject to federal and state securities regulations. “As 
a for-profit in Massachusetts,” noted Rose, “it would 
take us six months to go through the state securities 
registration process.” But the purchase and sale agree-
ment Wellspring signed with the SRA for the land 
had an expiration date on it—Wellspring didn’t have 
six months to raise the money. Nonprofits, however, 
are exempt from federal securities law and from state 
securities law in Massachusetts, and investments in 
Wellspring Harvest would be furthering a charitable 
mission of creating jobs for low-income workers. “So 
we formed a nonprofit,” Rose related, “creating the 
Wellspring Investment Fund that we spun off as an 
affiliated nonprofit with the Wellspring Cooperative 
Corporation. This entity is what issued the DPO. 
That meant that our nonprofit was taking on financial 
responsibility for this investment. The board of our 
nonprofit would become accountable, so we did a lot of 
work to make sure the risks were manageable.”
Consultant Jenny Kassan prepared a detailed 
Prospectus for the DPO, describing the offer of 
unsecured promissory notes, the Wellspring Harvest 
business plan, and the anticipated social impacts. 
The Prospectus also reviewed risk factors and inves-
tor suitability issues, such as the fact that the notes 
were unrated, unsecured, and uninsured; invest-
ments were not liquid (no secondary market exists to 
sell one’s DPO investment in Wellspring Harvest to 
other investors); note holders would not exercise any 
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management control over the Wellspring Investment 
Fund or the Wellspring Harvest greenhouse busi-
ness; and neither the federal Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) nor state securities regulators had 
reviewed the offering. Due to the use of nonprofit 
exemptions from state securities laws, the offer-
ing was limited to investors in Massachusetts and 
Connecticut (state securities laws on nonprofit securi-
ties offerings can vary significantly). According to 
Espinoza at LEAF, the legal costs for Wellspring to put 
together the documentation were $5,000.
While Zevin connected clients interested in the proj-
ect with Wellspring to purchase preferred equity, Fred 
Rose and Wellspring’s other co-director, Emily Kawano, 
set out to market their DPO. Rose said that “the indi-
viduals who did the DPO were much more local. Many 
of them were folks we knew who had an interest in 
local development; they were putting in their $1,000 or 
$5,000 to impact their community.” Wellspring also had 
a number of events both in the Springfield area and in 
Boston with prospective investors.
At the end of six months, Wellspring had raised 
$253,000 from forty-nine investors for its DPO, as well as 
$150,000 in preferred equity. Two investors made large 
DPO purchases. One individual invested $40,000, and a 
local foundation, The Beveridge Family Foundation, put 
in $35,000. Beveridge’s investment qualified as a “program 
related investment” that counted toward the foundation’s 
charitable giving requirements. But Wellspring also had 
many investors participating at smaller levels: twenty-one 
investors at the minimum of $1,000, and another twenty 
investors between $1,500 and $9,999. The median invest-
ment across all investors was $2,000.
In May 2017, Wellspring realized that cost increases 
in the greenhouse site development required the busi-
ness to raise an additional $150,000 for operating capital. 
The Wellspring Investment Fund reopened the DPO to 
raise half of these funds, which are being matched by 
additional loans. As of mid-August 2017, 80 percent of 
these additional DPO funds have been raised.
Wellspring has become an enthusiastic supporter of 
public offerings based on its experiences over the past 
year. “We have been enormously impressed by the num-
ber of people who want to invest their money in making 
their community a better place,” concluded Rose. “We 
never would have known that if we hadn’t taken the risk 
to put together the DPO. This kind of subordinate debt 
is the key to financing community development projects 
and makes the whole rest of the financing possible.”
How DPOs Work
One way of understanding a DPO is by contrasting it with 
an Initial Public Offering (IPO), which is the way that 
companies raise money by selling stocks on Wall Street.
• One key difference between a DPO and an IPO is 
that no intermediary agencies handle the issuance 
of the investment opportunity—the company is 
reaching out directly to potential investors. Thus, 
the costs of intermediation are reduced—although 
the company also must then market the security 
itself, or obtain help to do so. 
• A key advantage of approaching investors directly 
is that the terms of the DPO can be structured in 
such a way as to maintain control of the company. 
This advantage is especially important when the 
company is community-based or worker-owned 
and remaining that way is critical to the mission 
of the company, as was the case with Wellspring 
Harvest. 
• As is clear from the Wellspring Harvest story, 
DPOs do not have to be issuances of stock. A 
DPO can be made of any kind of security—debt, 
equity, or debt/equity hybrids such as royalty notes, 
convertible debt, or debt with equity kickers (like 
warrants). A business can thus structure the terms 
of financing offered in a DPO in exactly the way 
that works best for its business plan. 
Regulatory burdens can be significantly lower for a 
DPO. Generally, securities offerings are subject to a 
number of federal laws and regulations, including the 
Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, Regulation D 
of the federal Securities Exchange Commission, and 
numerous other laws and regulations, as well as state 
“blue sky” securities laws and regulations. However, 
there are a number of factors that DPOs can take 
advantage of to achieve a smoother path to issuance.1 
These include:
• A nonprofit issuer can be exempt from both federal 
and state securities laws, depending on the regula-
tions of the specific state they are in (as was the 
case for Wellspring Harvest).
• The Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS 
Act) was passed in 2012 with SEC rules allowing 
“regulation crowdfunding” going into effect in 
2016. The rules exempt companies from federal 
securities registration requirements when they sell 
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less than $1 million of securities in a year, provided 
they meet certain other conditions, and permit 
individual investors with incomes of less than 
$100,000 to invest up to the greater of $2,000 or 
5 percent of their annual income. A business may 
also obtain an exemption from federal securities 
laws if it limits its offering to just one state.
In all cases, businesses should still consult with pro-
fessional legal advice to ensure that they structure their 
DPO properly to comply with applicable laws and regu-
lations. Businesses will still need to take care to provide 
clear and adequate information to potential investors, 
and comply with anti-fraud laws and regulations.
Another way of understanding a DPO is thinking of 
it as “crowdfunding a security.” With the passage of the 
JOBS Act, as described above, this strategy is now a bona 
fide business financing option. Moreover, the JOBS Act 
also provides for the development of online platforms 
through which DPOs can be marketed, with guidance 
that the operators of such platforms must follow.
Other Examples of DPOs
In New England, other companies using DPOs to raise 
capital have included (but are not limited to):
• Democracy Brewing, which is raising $350,000 
in preferred equity at a targeted 5 percent return 
through stock dividends, has a goal to purchase 
shares back from investors within five years.2
• Cero, a composting and recycling worker coopera-
tive in Dorchester, Massachusetts, which raised 
$340,000 from eighty-three investors, has invest-
ments ranging between $2,500 to $25,000.3 LEAF 
was among the investors in this DPO.
• In Vermont, an initiative of VSECU Credit Union 
called “Milk Money” provides a platform for 
potential investors to view DPO offerings from 
Vermont companies.4
Conclusion: Advice for Business 
Owners and Alternative Financiers
Business owners seeking to finance business start-up 
and acquisition should be aware of a broad range of 
different “colors of money” that are available to them. 
As they develop their capitalization strategy, owners 
should consider the following factors that can impact 
the appropriateness of different financing options:
• Their own goals vis-à-vis long-term ownership of 
the company versus eventual sale to new owners
• Goals for retaining control of the company, includ-
ing whether the company envisions itself as a 
community-based or worker-owned business
• Degree of support and connections the company 
may have with prospective small investors in the 
community
• Willingness of the company to directly engage 
in marketing investment opportunities to the 
community
• Size of the investment needed
• Amount of the investment that can be covered 
through senior debt, given projected cash flow and 
valuation of the company
• Willingness of the company to share sales revenues 
or an ownership stake in the company as a way of 
obtaining growth financing
• Bandwidth of the company to engage in more com-
plex legal work and deal structuring negotiations
Alternative financiers, such as nonprofit Community 
Development Financial Institution loan funds, can play 
important roles in broadening the palette of financing 
options available to community businesses. If support-
ing the growth of local community businesses is their 
mission, these financing organizations may want to 
consider:
• Developing hybrid debt-equity products to fill the 
needs for equity-like financing for businesses that 
are not good candidates for venture capital
• Building technical assistance capacity to help 
business owners sift through the range of financ-
ing options that are available to them and connect 
them with appropriate legal advice
• Helping to establish or partnering with platforms 
that can help companies market Direct Public 
Offerings
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Endnotes
1. For further discussion of Securities regulation issues, see 
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission website: https://
www.sec.gov/fast-answers. An SEC factsheet on “regulation 
crowdfunding” is available at: https://www.sec.gov/news/
pressrelease/2015-249.html. This report is not intended to 
provide legal advice. Businesses should obtain professional 
legal representation to ensure that they structure their DPO 
properly to comply with applicable laws and regulations.
2. Democracy Brewing, “Invest!” http://www.
democracybrewing.com/invest/.
3. Cutting Edge Capital, “$340,000 Raised by Composting 
and Recycling Worker Cooperative in Massachusetts,” 
https://www.cuttingedgecapital.com/cerodpo/.
4. Milk Money, https://milkmoneyvt.com/.
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